

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN EGYPT

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Abstract

Present study I would like to write about asymmetric warfare, which was used by the terrorist groups in Egypt. In the first part, I will examine the theory of asymmetric warfare. Then I will show the different asymmetric tools, which were used by the terrorist organizations, and the answers, the government gave to them.

Keywords: Egypt, Asymmetric Warfare, Terrorism, Wilayat Sinai, Libya

Disciplines: history, military science

Absztrakt

ASZIMMETRIKUS HADVISELÉS EGYIPTOMBAN

Jelen tanulmányban az aszimmetrikus hadviselésről lesz szó, amelyet az egyiptomi terrorista csoportok alkalmaztak. Az első részben az aszimmetrikus hadviselés elmélete kerül megvitatásra, majd a terrrorszervezetek által használt különböző aszimmetrikus eszközöket és a kormány által rájuk adott válaszokat mutatjuk be.

Kulcsszavak: Egyiptom, Aszimmetrikus Hadviselés, Terrorizmus, Wilayat Sinai, Líbia

Diszciplínák: történelem, hadtudomány

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In this essay, I would like to examine the Asymmetric warfare and it is used in Egypt against the Egyptian government. I have chosen this topic because I would like to see, how a Middle-Eastern country deals with the terrorist threat with their toolkit. The terrorist organizations appeared in other countries in the area, so the examination of their attempts will help us understand their activities in these countries. Asymmetric warfare is also an interesting subject because it hasn't got any clear definition nowadays. So we can speak about Asymmetric warfare (Lele, 2012, Resperger, 2017), Fourth Generation Warfare (Lind, 1987; Somkuti, 2012; Kis-Álmos, 2012), or hybrid Warfare (Gerasimov, 2013, Primakov, 2013). I don't want to make a clear definition, I would examine only the tools of this warfare. I need them to explain the operations and organizations of Egypt's terrorist groups. So this will occupy the first part. In the second part, I will show you the rise up of these groups, and examine their operations. It will help us to distinguish the different groups, and determine the Asymmetric tools which were used in today's warfare. It will help also the different militaries of the world because they can prepare themselves for the newest Asymmetric challenges. Besides them, I will show the answers, the government tried to apply to eliminate the terrorist threat. They used mostly military ones, but recently they converted to using non-military measures (economic developments, social measures).

The Egyptian government now trying to separate the terrorists from the civilians, and win the hearts of the population in the Sinai. However it will be a long road, and the terrorists now attacking the returning civilians with booby traps. However, with the help of the tribes of the Sinai, the government will be able to eliminate the terrorist groups in Egypt. My essay has three objectives. The first one is examining the Asymmetric warfare and applying its theses to the Egyptian situation. Then see the behavior of the non-state actors (terrorist groups, tribes civilians). After that, I would like to find different types of answers against the Asymmetric threats, which would be applicable in different countries against Asymmetric actors. I will end this study with my conclusions.

Characteristics of the asymmetric warfare

The theory of Asymmetric warfare was created at the end of the 20th or at the beginning of the 21st century, to give answers to the experiences which were received by the western militaries in the conflict zones (for example Afghanistan, and Iraq). However it hasn't got a unified definition, and the authors can describe it differently (Lele, 2014). This type of conflict was used on many continents, and its appearance of it can be described by the changes in international relations and the warfare also. For example, the appearance of gerilla warfare, the globalisation, and the borning interdependence or the mass

diffusion of small weapons helped to create the Asymmetric warfare (Somkuti, 2012).

In the 21st century, the state's monopoly of violence was reduced, and non-governmental actors have taken it (terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates, or tribes). Therefore the state can't keep up the order, and civil wars could have erupted (Resperger, 2017). The line between peace and war would be disappeared because the operations of the Asymmetric warfare can't reach the level of war. The war didn't have a beginning and a punctual end. Like in Egypt, where the army fought against terrorist cells, however, the country functioned in a time of peace. The terrorist groups are using this type of war fondly against a stronger, more conventional opponent, to gain the upper hand. These organizations have state-like functions (they have an army, they can make money, or keep up the social infrastructure) (Kiss-Álmos, 2009). These organizations are small, they have many cells in one country, and they don't have to cooperate, like in Egypt. Here, there are many organizations, and they don't cooperate with each other. But they fight separately against the Egyptian army because they want to overthrow the military regime. They fight with non-conventional methods and use cheap, innovative tools which are caused huge destruction (suicide bombings, assassinations).

With their operations, they try to make influence the population of the country. So

those are shown on different types of social media (television, Twitter, Facebook) to gain support and make the enemy fear (Price, 2013). The Asymmetric organizations are decentralized. They have many cells in the same country, and they can move to another neighboring state either. Their leadership wasn't unified, so it wasn't easy to locate and destroy it. They use so many different tools, so the defense against them is complicated (Long, 2007). The Asymmetric side works with cheap and easy attainment weapons, which curtail military training. However, the conventional side had to buy expensive weapons, and train their soldier for months, or years to use them. (Resperger, 2016). And they have to keep up and restore the infrastructure as well. Moreover, the Asymmetric forces don't have to make transparent operations, the other side had to become compliant, and play by the rules. They should explain their motives and operations to the public, keeping their support (Verweij, 2009). The Asymmetric forces didn't have such boundaries. They could use any means necessary.

Asymmetric warfare in Egypt by the terrorists

The causes of the rebellion

The Sinai peninsula is situated between Asia and Africa, and its territory is 60 000 square kilometers. The northern area is highly populated, mostly by bedouins, and 60% of the population are living there. This area was closed, and there are few

routes, which join the main country. This area was occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War (05.06.1967.-10.06.1967). Egypt received back this region with Camp-David Accord in 1978. However, it changed the development of the area (Iddris, 2017).

Egypt prepared for another war, and if that would have happened, they had tried to use the Sinai as a buffer zone. So they didn't develop the area at all. And they didn't trust the bedouins either, because they thought, that they helped the Israelis in the Yom-Kippur War (06.10.1973-25.10.1973). It wasn't true, but it didn't matter. So bedouins were marginalized, and they became secondary citizens of the state. They couldn't receive Egyptian citizenship, and couldn't become members of the army, or the administration. The Egyptian state neither governed this area, they let the bedouins make it. So the Northern Sinai enjoyed a quasi-half-autonomous state, which helped the rebellion to erupt (Dentice, 2018). Moreover, the Southern part was highly developed, thanks to the tourism of the Red Sea. In the meantime the Northern part of the peninsula the population wasn't able to receive the basic services (medicine, food.) Thus the locals started to smuggle these via tunnels. Also, they didn't smuggle only medicines, but weapons, and of course the terrorists used these tunnels to infiltrate the area. The security agencies tried to eliminate these tunnels, but these measures made conflicted with the bedouins. (Genty,2018.) And the extremist

groups tried to exploit these conflicts and began to recruit members from the young bedouins. The bedouins didn't believe in the extremist ideas, but their inadequate conditions turn them against the government (Dentice, 2018).

From the Arab Spring to the end of the presidency of Mursi

The Arab Spring was introduced in Tunisia, and its main cause was the bad living conditions in the Middle East. However, from the social sphere, it emerged as anti-Mubarak protests. Against these protests, the military forces of the Sinai were transported to the mainland. Of course, this act made a power vacuum in the Northern Sinai Peninsula, which was guarded by a few military forces, thanks to the Camp-David Accord. This divided the peninsula into four parts, and the guarding forces are reduced from zone A to D, and in the last one, there were only police forces (Watanaben 2015). So the government didn't leave any potential force to keep up the order. Therefore the locals rebelled attacked the local police stations and took weapons. They also received weapons from other conflict zones (such as Libya). The terrorists also gained recruitment from the prisons in Egypt. They could either attack Israel, which had to send special operations team to its southern border and built a huge wall. To regain the peninsula the Egyptian military launched a military operation, called Operation Eagle (Katz, 2011). Two

special operations divisions participated in it with 250 vehicles.

Their main task was to occupy the places with strategic importance and eliminate the terrorist organizations. Then they had to push the remaining members to the middle of the area, where they couldn't hide, and easily windable. These special operation divisions were supported by helicopters, which tried to eliminate terrorist hideouts and stocks (Khaled, 2011). In the beginning, the operation was successful. For example on 15 August, the army could seize a terrorist who hid out in a city and killed one terrorist, arresting four. They found weapons and components for bombs.

The military also tried to guard the cities with checkpoints. However, it wasn't successful, because the military gave up its own mobility, and the extremists could avoid or attack them, and escape easily. They used the cover of the night, which gave them a surprise. The first attacks were mostly gun fires. The attacks were committed by individuals, who escaped after the act. Moreover, they weren't able to chase by the military. There was a checkpoint that was attacked by thirty times (Maher, 2012).

The attacks were dropped suddenly but emerged in August of 2012 when a checkpoint was attacked. This act was made at night under the festival of Ramadan. The border guard troops prepared themselves for dinner when the terrorist caught them off-guard. Sixteen of them were slain (Al-Jazeera, 2012). After

this attack, the military started another operation. This received the name of Operation Sinai. The military changed its previous tactic, first made air strikes against terrorist hideouts in the towns of the area, then invaded them with PCVs and military forces. The number of house searches increased, and the military said that they caught the perpetrators of the attack in August (CNN, 2012). However, this operation was applied to other villages also, where the terrorists lived. Nevertheless, the mass arrests in these settlements made the locals angry. Because the terrorists knew when the military came and escaped from the area. So the military arrested the civilians instead of the terrorists, such as happened in the village of Madhya (CNN, 2012).

The terrorists in the first stage of the rebellion tried to avoid the fight with the military. They knew, that they could be killed easily, thus, they attacked the hights. Because they wanted to avoid the chase of the military. One of the main bases was the mountain of Jebel-Halal, which was a priority target for the military. Therefore they tried to occupy frequently, but they achieved this goal only in 2017 (Draa, 2012). The peacekeeping unit of the UN received attacks from the insurgents also. The first attack came in 2012 from the mountains, luckily they didn't lose any men (Time of Israel, 2012). Until then a new government was elected, which was created by the Muslim Brotherhood. They tried new methods to settle the insurgency. First of all, they strengthened the

cooperation between other states. Their main allies were the United States, and Israel also.

From the United States Egypt has received intelligence information about the terrorist cells, and modern weapons either (Myers, 2012). With Israel, the county made intelligence cooperation. Highly ranked Egyptian officers traveled to Tel-Aviv, where they made talks about exchanges of intelligence information, common operations, and the change of the captured soldiers (Moran, 2016). In the meantime, the extremist organizations infiltrated the cities of the mainland. In 2013, the security forces arrested a group, and they found a significant amount of money and components of bombs at them.

However, the terrorist organizations haven't made any attacks yet, the security forces counted on it. They interrogated the members of the group, and they confessed, that there were many members of terrorist cells, who were hidden beside the worshippers of the main mosques. At the main time, the president tried to use new tools against the extremist.

Mursi wanted to win the hearts of the locals, so he gave back some of the pastoral fields to the tribes, and started an economic development program (Idris, 2017). The locals loved him, but the coup of the military changed everything.

The first four years of Sisi (2013-2017)

Meanwhile, on the mainland, a huge protest against the government erupted.

The protesters didn't accept the centralization of power of the Muslim Brotherhood, the rising significance of the religion, which filled the Egyptian politics, and the enormous corruption. Thus, the military exploited the situation and dismissed the president. In spite of this, the sympathizers of the government made protested against the coup, which was eliminated by force. The military also pronounced the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization (Worth, 2013). The members of the organization were executed or sent to prison. There, many of them weren't separated from the extremists, and their number was grown (Aman, 2014). This event had an effect on the Sinai peninsula also. The locals condemned the coup because it was made against an Islamic government, which tried to make their lives better. So they didn't accept the new government, and the attacks against the military continued. The number of them was raised enormously, for example in April of 2013 there were many attacks that targeted the soldiers and the military personnel. The biggest threat was a new group, which was called Ansar Bay al-Maqdis (The Supporters of Jerusalem). This group was created possibly at the end of 2011 or in early 2012 when under the Arab Spring many detainees escaped from prison and went hiding in the peninsula. So its members were mostly criminals, bedouins, or former military personnel, who created and taught the tactics of this terrorist organization (Schweitzer, 2015). This group was

activated after the coup, and it became the largest terrorist cell in Egypt. They obeyed the Islamic State, and after that received a new name, Wilayat Sinai, (Sinai Province) (TIMEP, 2014).

They used suicide bombings, as one of their tools. The Sinai Province applied it as a psychological tool, to erase fear, and as a part of their operations. It was started to use after the organization joined the Islamic State. Thereupon the terrorists of the Islamic State wandered to Egypt via the tunnels, and important positions were taken by them in the Sinai Province. The newbies introduced new tools and operation styles to the former Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. And the organization got acquainted with the suicide bombings. They used this tool differently. The suicide bombings could be used as an introduction. For example, the terrorists attacked with this tool many checkpoints and diverted the forces of the army from their true target. After that, they could attack the military personnel from the wings, or from higher grounds. They could also use this tool to finish their operation. In that type of operation, they shot at the soldiers from all angles and divided their attention. After that, the suicide bomber detonated himself and made huge casualties (Huffman, 2015). And the security forces couldn't make an adequate answer against it. When the attack was finished, they closed the area and searched for the assailants. In order to find them, they made huge arrests among the local residents. Meanwhile, they didn't leave

their checkpoints and made little patrolling. They tried to convince the locals to stay at home, so they distributed fliers by plane (Huffman, 2015). In order to make pressure on the terrorist organizations, the Egyptian military tried to eliminate the tunnels at the eastern border. First of all, they destroyed the local houses in a 500 m circle to control the smuggling areas. Then they attacked these tunnels and destroyed them. The military also wanted to make the terrorist's stocks move into the center of the peninsula, where the helicopters could deal with them easily (Gold, 2014). Until then Egypt had to make efforts to control the western border also, because the Libyan civil war emerged, and terrorist cells gained important parts of it. They smuggled personnel and equipment on the vast land of Egypt's western border, supporting the Sinai Province. So Egypt had to participate in the civil war to eliminate this route. In 2015 ISIS in Libya executed 21 Coptic Egyptian workers. In retaliation, the Egyptian Air Force made bombings against the Islamic State's Libyan locations (BBC, 2015). However, the Sinai Province made a huge mistake, which later caused many losses to them. After their former organization pledged loyalty to the Islamic State the Sinai Province attacked the local tribesmen and civilians also. They executed or kidnapped the locals, and demanded pay from their relatives. The terrorist changed their behaviour, because they believed, that the civilians helped the military against them (NBC, 2014). So the

tribes made a common agreement. They forbade their kinsmen to participate in the operations of the Sinai Province.

If they tried to do it, they were banned from the tribe, and they weren't protected by the tribes. This arrangement was effective for the owners of the local undertakings. The leaders of the tribes declared, that they will help the military and asked the locals to stay home. The tribes were fed up with how the Sinai Province treated their members. They kidnapped and murdered their leaders and members. However, when the Sinai Province tried the same methods on the Tarabin tribe, then a fight erupted between them. After this incident, the tribes of the Sinai helped the military with intelligence information about terrorist groups and made antiterrorist operations alone also. (The Tahrir Institute For Middle East Policy, 2018). However, the locals didn't trust the military, because after the attacks there were mass arrests when innocent civilians were caught. Also, many civilians died in the anti-terrorist operations, and this could turn the locals against the military.

In the meantime, the Sinai Province was suppressed. First of all, it was caused by the loss of territories in Syria by the mother organization, which couldn't help with manpower, weapons, and cash to their Egyptian brothers. Also, the Sinai Province suffered terrible losses against the military, and they weren't able to use sophisticated tools. Their operations became clumsy also. This was the

consequence of the airstrike in 2016. Which aimed at the mountain of the Jebel Halal, where the leaders of the Sinai Province kept a meeting. The attack eliminated the leaders of the terrorist group, and they had to adapt to the new situation (Schweitzer, 2016). In the meantime with the suppression of the Islamic State Al Qaeda was reemerged as a serious rival. In 2011, there was an Al Qaeda cell in the Sinai the Jund al Islam. They had a serious attack against the military, but they began fighting with the Sinai Province, which almost terminated the Jund al-Islam. They reappeared in 2017 when in an audio file they admitted an attack in 2015 and declared their rivalry with the Sinai Province (Salem, 2017). Al Qaeda tried to minimize the influence of the Islamic State with the unification of their cells. Thus the organization created the Islamic, and Muslim Support Group, to make joint operations in the African civil wars. They tried to expand carefully in Egypt because they didn't want to get the attention of the military.

In 2015 terrorist groups started to attack tourist sites. The Sinai Province possibly wanted to make an attack on the Qarnak tourist site. Three armed persons, one of them a suicide bomber, wanted to sneak inside, but the guards have seen them and intercepted the terrorists. In the fight, one of the attackers blew himself up, and his partners were shot down. I said that the attackers were members of the Sinai Province because they tried to make a

suicide bombing. And only this organization used this method.

In 2017, there were two other suicide bombings in Egypt, against the Coptic community. The Copts are the Christian minority of Egypt, they give up 20 % of the population (Hulsman, 2012). They have received discrimination from the state in the Ottoman era. Under Mubarak they suffered from state discrimination in the areas of university admissions, public spending, military promotions, and official requirements for building or repairing churches. When the Arab Spring erupted, the Copts protested beside their Muslim citizens. However, after the revolution the attacks against the Copts were growing, there were 100 attacks against Copts between 2011-2013. Mostly Coptic churches and countryside homes were destroyed (Copts of Egypt, World minorities, 2020). Despite this, they became the target of the suppressed Sinai Province. On April 9 of 2017, two simultaneous attacks happened in Alexandria and Tanta. The terrorists attacked the masses on Palm Sunday. In Tanta, the attacker could bypass the security services, and detonate himself inside the church, killing 28 and injuring 77 people (Egypt's Coptic churches hit by deadly blasts on Palm Sunday, 2017). In Alexandria, the attacker hasn't received such luck, because he was stopped at a checkpoint by the security. He realized, that he couldn't kill Copts with the bomb, so he blew himself up before the church (Hendawi, 2017). Seventeen people

remained dead and 48 were injured. After the attacks, the copt criticized the security forces, because before the attack a bomb was found close to the Alexandrian Church. However, they didn't do anything to strengthen the nearby buildings and roads. And the Coptic mass criticized that the government didn't do anything to protect them. Thus clashes erupted between the Copts and the Muslims/security forces (Hanna, 2019). There fore inside the Coptic Church the policy of Twadros II., which was supported by the government, was disputed by other priests.

The second four years of Sisi (2017-2021)

In 2017 the terrorist operations in the Sinai Peninsula were decreased. However, on the mainland new organizations were born. First of all, I would like to write about the HASM movement (Ḥarakat Sāwa'd Miṣr, the Armed People of Egypt, but the HASM means determination in Arabic). We don't know its origin, the government accused the Muslim Brotherhood creating the group. In spite of this, we have little evidence that this claim was true (Lavrilleux, 2020). Their first attack happened in August of 2016 when tried to murder Ali Gomaa, the main priest of al-Azhar. This attack was unsuccessful because his bodyguard could intervene and repelled the attack (Cummings, 2017). After it, they executed

a member of the security agency, when he tried to reach his car (Horton, 2017).

They have two types of operations. In the first one, they tried to attack one, or a couple of targets with guns. The attackers want to surprise their target and execute him. Their targets are mostly high-ranked military officers, administration officers, or checkpoints. The second tool is the bomb outrage. In this type, the terrorist makes a self-assembly bomb and hides it near their target. Then, when the time is right, the bomb is exploded with remote control. This happened on the sixth of December when a remote-controlled bomb exploded at a checkpoint in the quarter Haram of Gíza. Six police officers remained dead after the explosion (Youssef, 2016). These tools help the terrorists to avoid the civil victims in their attacks. The HASM is active in the cities, and they tried to stay mobile, so they don't have many members. The organization was made to defend the rights of Muslims. Thus on the 8th of October 2017, they attacked the embassy of Miammar with a bomb. The organization made this operation because the government of Miammar didn't respect the rights of the Muslim Rohingyas. (Mansour, 2018). Against these groups, the security forces tried to close the main roads and streets with checkpoints, although this measure didn't stop the terrorist from conducting new attacks. The police also patrolled these areas, arrested many suspects, moreover seized components of bombs and weapons. However, we didn't know

punctually, how many were terrorists among the detained persons. The numbers, which were given by the military and the police were too high, that the terrorist groups should have been eliminated by that time. In spite of this, they were continuing their operations, which means, that many detainees were innocent. And after the attacks they were executed, which raised the problem of the extrajudicial killings. (Rights group: 3,185 extrajudicial killings in Egypt since 2013, 2019).

In the meantime, the terrorist organizations started to attack tourists again. On the 28th of December 2018, a bomb exploded near the pyramids of Giza. The bomb was hidden in the dustbin next to the museum of the pyramids. Three Vietnamese tourists and their guide were killed (Youssef, 2018). In the May of 2019, a very similar attack happened, without dead people, although there were some injured (Hassan, 2019). The most serious attack was made in 2015 against a Russian jet. The Sinai Province possibly made the jet explode, and all of the passengers (129 victims) were dead. (Russia plane crash: 'Terror act' downed A321 over Egypt's Sinai, 2015). The attack was successful, because the airport wasn't guarded properly, and the terrorist could take the bomb up to the plane. The extremist organizations tried to attack the tourists because the country receives huge income from this sector. Thus, the terrorists wanted to eliminate this income source and made a huge blow to the government.

However, they couldn't cause much harm to the tourist sector. Because they were guarded by the Egyptian authorities. The sector received a huge blow from the Covid virus, not from the terrorists. Fortunately, the Egyptians could reopen their sites and hotels after the first pandemic, and the country accepts 300 000 tourists/per day (Tourists return to Egypt's resorts after months of restrictions, 2021).

After 2017 a new territory gained the focus of the Egyptian counter-terrorism efforts, the area of the Western border. This region has a common border with Libya. After the civil war erupted there, the Egyptian army made everything possible to contain the area. They feared, that the border was used to smuggle weapons, and personnel to the terrorist organizations of Egypt. The western territories are arid and huge, so it is easy to smuggle weapons and men into the country. In that area, there was an attack earlier, when the assailants tried to kill the interior minister. This act was unsuccessful. (Kirkpatrick, 2013). After this attack, the military tightened their control on the area, although in 2015 they shot out a Mexican tourist bus, which wandered into the area accidentally. (Mexican tourists killed by Egyptian security forces, 2015). Whereas the attack happened, the military restricted the news from the border area. The next attack happened in 2017. In this operation, 10 police officers and 34 policemen were murdered. The act was recognized by the Ansar al-Islam organization (Markey,

2017). It was created possibly in Libya in 2014. The members of it received military training, and they were smuggled into Egypt after that. They didn't belong to the Islamic State franchise, because they pledged loyalty to the Al-Qaeda group. Their attack was professional which means, that their members were ex-military. Strengthen this idea that they didn't execute the newly recruited policemen. After this attack, the security forces made a huge antiterrorist operation in the border zone. They managed to free a captured police officer, and with his statement, the security forces detained or killed many terrorists, and seized weapons, and components of bombs also. The lieutenant of this organization, Abdel Hamid, was executed in an airstrike on 31.11.2017 (Cummings, 2017).

Because of the dangerous western border, Egypt intervenes actively in the Libyan civil war. The air force of the country made airstrikes against the local Islamic State group in 2015, because they executed Egyptian Coptic laborers. (Egyptian air strikes in Libya kill dozens of ISIS militants, 2015). Egypt supported general Khalifa Haftar, because they thought, that he could manage to unite the country and eliminate the terrorist groups. Moreover, the government wanted to repeal the Muslim Brotherhood from the country, which is part of the government of Tripoli. (Mahmoud, 2018). So Egypt is sending intelligence information, and weapons, and made airstrikes in the

country against terrorist bases (Dentice, 2017).

The last airstrike, which was conducted by Egypt, was in 2017. At this time, they attacked the bases and storages of the Derna Mujaheddin Shura Council. This operation was an answer against the attacks, which aimed at the Copts in Minya. However, the Derna Mujaheddin Shura Council didn't target Copts, they neither cooperated with the Islamic State nor any Egyptian terrorist groups. They weren't activated in Egypt, only in Derna and its neighborhood. Thus the Egyptian attack's main goal was to take revenge against the interior terrorist organizations because, at home, they thought themselves incapable to do it. And also they tried to help reaching Haftar's war goals. (Dentice, 2017.) The two players had a deep collaboration. For example, when Haftar's forces captured Hesham Ashmawy, the Egyptian leader of the terrorist organization al-Mourabitun, he was given to the Egyptian authorities by them. He received a trial in Egypt, and he was sentenced to death and executed. (Egyptian officer-turned-extremist Hesham Ashmawy executed: Military, 2020) In 2020 Turkey entered into the civil war and sent conventional forces and Syrian mercenaries to Libya. They fought on the side of the GNA and helped to educate the forces of the Tripolitanian government. And Turkey helped push back Haftar's forces, thus changing the equilibrium (Harchaoui, 2018). Haftar was ousted from Tripoli and kept the eastern

area of the country. Therefore Egypt increased its support to Haftar, and the country tried to participate in the Libyan negotiations. Egypt trained 50 soldiers of Haftar to conduct maritime operations against the Turkish ships, to eliminate the supply chain of the Tripolitanian Government (Egypt, UAE establish Libya naval commando squad to fight Turkey, 2020).

In September 2020. the Egyptian president carried out a threat against the GNA. He said that if their soldiers would have stepped across the Benghazi-Sirte line, the Egyptian forces had intervened in Libya (Averting an Egyptian Military Intervention in Libya, 2020). He made this declaration because Egypt is afraid of the stronger Turkish positions in the Mediterranean area. Moreover, they didn't want that the Muslim Brotherhood would return to Libya. Although Egypt tried to handle this problem flexibly. Thus they started to support the negotiations between the participants in the conflict in the second half of 2020. They either promoted the ceasefire agreement on 23. 10. 2020. Before this happened, the participants had been holding meetings in Cairo in September. Egypt changed its policy because realized, that it had to use different tools (mostly diplomatic) to stop the Turkish advance (Anani, 2021). Moreover, the negotiations were begun between Turkey and Egypt in 2020. Although this could mean an easing process, the two participants have serious debates between them. For example,

Turkey would send home the Syrian mercenaries, but the Turkish military would stay in the country, which is unacceptable to Egypt. And even Turkey didn't want to send the members of the Muslim Brotherhood to Egypt, so this also cause a clash between the two countries (Egypt and Turkey seek to overhaul tense ties with frank talks on Libya, 2021).

Also, Egypt is affiliated with the government of Tripoli. They sent a delegation to the city on 27. December 2020. (Egyptian delegation visits Libyan capital for talks with GNA, 2020.) The Libyan rival groups also made an accord in 2021 that they will keep a common election in December. Moreover, a united government will be created by them. The prime minister of the Tripoli government also had a meeting with Sisi, who ensured him that he will support the united government (Shalhub, 2021).

Besides the problem of Libya, in the Sinai peninsula, there were other attacks. In 2017 forty gunmen attacked the mosque of al-Rawda. This mosque was the church of the Sufi Islam school. 311 people have died from the attack, and the number of injured was thousands (Youssef, 2017). The attack was proclaimed by the Sinai Province, however, it made clashes between the members, and some of them questioned the methods of the terrorist organization. After the act, the Egyptian government started a new operation, which was called the Comprehensive Operation of Sinai. This operation was a joint cooperation between the army, the

navy, the police, and the border guard units. They tried to eliminate the terrorist threat collectively (Mohamad, 2019). However, the attendances made operations not just inside the peninsula, but at the western border of the country. Because this operation helped the government confuse the supply chain of the terrorists (Shay, 2019).

The starting date of the operation was on 28 February 2018. Before they could launch the operation, the military closed the traffic road junctions reducing the movement of the terrorists. This military operation was public in the newspapers and television, so the military has often declared the successes and the arrests. According to the official statements, the military arrested 7491 and eliminated 464 terrorists. (Amer, 2019.) Although these numbers were too high, so the civil organizations and the mass media agencies questioned the numbers. Thus it could be possible that many dead persons and detainees weren't terrorists, but rather civilians. The number of death was huge also, it could mean extrajudicial killings (Strock, 2021).

In order to disturb the supply chains of the terrorists, the military blocked the main social services in the peninsula. Thus they introduced curfews in the northern part of the peninsula and distrained the food supply in the area. All of these meant that 420 000 residents didn't receive an adequate food supply. The pharmacies and the gas stations also closed, so the people hasn't received the necessary pills, and oil,

because the basic services were shut down. (Egyptian Front for Human Rights, 2018).

The border guard units also made checkpoints near the border which served to eliminate the weapon smuggling. This meant, that the houses of the locals were demolished (Egypt: Looming Humanitarian Crisis in Sinai, Relief Urgently Needed After 2 Months of Army Restrictions on Food, 2018). The security forces either tried to shut down the Internet to block the terrorists communications. In spite of this, the terrorists managed to get access to their social media accounts, and were able to communicate their messages to the locals. They although couldn't reach the only bank in the Sinai without the Internet (Human Rights Organizations Call On Egypt's Government To End Internet Censorship And Website Blocking 2020).

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However, the terrorists managed to make attacks in spite of the measures of the government. Although the number of the attacks was shrunk to 18 per month (Amer, 2019). The groups used their previous tools and tried to combine them strengthening their usefulness. I can mention the suicide bombings. In 2018, the terrorists attacked the 101st brigade. The attackers cut the fences, and first, they attacked with guns. When they reached the command center blew themselves up. (Wilayat Sinai targets Egyptian army stronghold, 2018). The attacks reached military strongholds also. In the Qasima barracks, they made operations with weapons and suicide vests killing eight soldiers (Bassil, 2019). The military officers and government officials were suffered also from assassination attempts. The convoy of the main military officer, Hassan al-Husseini, was attacked, and he got off it with injuries (Amer, 2019). The Sinai Province, similar to the Islamic State, made checkpoints on the main roads. They checked the papers of the travelers and tried to filter out those, who didn't follow their strict religious rules. With this technique, they caught soldiers and executed them immediately (Hassan, 2017).

The government used non-military tools against the insurgents in the last couple of years. The most important tool is the economic development of the northern part of the peninsula, which was effaced at

the beginning of the time of Sisi. He renewed it in 2014 when the Engineer Authority started the development with the help of the military (Hanafi, 2021.) They mostly developed the road and railway system. Nowadays the government started many new projects, which will be able to make the area fruitful. For example, reservoirs were created and new models were introduced, which will be able to keep the water consumption at a low level (President Sisi reviews progress of Sinai development projects, 2020).

Many more projects are under development. The government will pay 2,69 billion dollars to reach the adequate development level in Sinai. They collected the money from their own resources, and also from the undertakings of the Arab countries, and from the USAID (Egypt secures \$2.69B for Sinai development in 2020, 2020). Nowadays the government is building roads, reservoirs, and bridges. But the Egyptians are planning to build hospitals, schools, and touristic buildings. The government also plans to move new residents, and former civilians back to the area. They will be settled by professions (miners, doctors, tourist workers). The government's purpose with this goal that reopens the economic development of the area. And also they mean to make the support of the terrorist groups decline. (Hassan, 2017). However, the terrorist groups were accommodated in this new situation. Thus they reorganized their attacks. Nowadays they don't conduct their operations with a couple of attackers,

but they send one attacker only or make roadside bombings (Shifting militant tactics curb development in Egypt's North Sinai, 2020).

They used the same methods against the resettlement of the peninsula. Inside the abandoned villages and towns, they left booby traps. With these, they tried to stop the migration into the peninsula and kill as many civilians as possible (Sweilam, 2020). The group also returned to the usage of the roadside bombs, which harmed the military convoys (Egypt Officials: Bomb Kills 1 Police and Wounds 3 in Sinai, 2021). Although they are using a new tool, the lone snipers. These attackers were placed in military-occupied areas, and they could live with the civilians in these settlements. These people were barely recognizable, so they could conduct operations easily, then disappear into the masses of the cities. The numbers were growing significantly. In 2018 and 19 sixteen sniper attacks were committed, in 2020 January and September eighteen attacks were made. (Shifting militant tactics curb development in Egypt's North Sinai, 2020).

Although the checkpoint attacks weren't disappeared. In the July of 2021, a checkpoint was attacked by the terrorists in Seik Zuveid. In this attack 5 soldiers were dead and many were injured (5 Egyptian troops killed in Islamic State attack in northern Sinai, 2021). Although the military declared that they make the area secure it wasn't true. The Sinai Province placed their center in the area of

Bir al-Abd, which is arid and difficult to control (Shifting militant tactics curb development in Egypt's North Sinai, 2020). However, the terrorist organization is not as strong as it was in 2014 or 2015. The Islamic State was suppressed and the tribes of Sinai also attacks the Sinai Province. The tribes didn't help just within tels, but they made common anti-terrorist operations with the military. These were so successful, that the Sinai Province last many of its members, and nowadays the members are from Egypt and Palestine territories. In 2021 a high-ranking officer, Abu Hamza al-Qadi, surrendered himself to the Tribe Union of the Sinai. He was a jurist of the Sinai Province, and he knew the full of organization of the terrorist group. With his help, the military and the tribes will be able to possibly eliminate the group much more easily (Islamic State leader in Sinai surrenders to Egyptian authorities, 2021).

Conclusion

In this essay, I have tried analyzing the Egyptian insurgency as an Asymmetric threat. The terrorists of this uprising are Asymmetric players because they use cheap tools in very creative ways. They are working in cells, which were distributed in the whole country, although they didn't cooperate with each other. We can draw up a development circle for them. In the first few years of the insurgency, they conducted mostly one attacker operations. For example, a gunner attacked a checkpoint and tried to eliminate the

guards. And the cells also made roadside bombs, which could make injuries and damage the military vehicles. After the Sisi coup, the terrorists became stronger, thanks to the growing numbers of the members of the cells, and the development in their financial status (mostly the Sinai province), they conducted sophisticated attacks in the Sinai. In the meantime, in the cities of Egypt, smaller cells were created, which operated with gun attacks and roadside bombs. They chose these tools, because they had fewer numbers, unlike the Sinai Province, and couldn't risk that the members would have perished in an attack. However, the Egyptian security forces could locate the members, and they have detained. Meanwhile, in the Sinai, the former Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged loyalty to the Islamic State and with it gained huge resources and manpower, who brought with them new tools (suicide bombings) and new methods. With it, the Sinai Province could cause huge damage to the security forces of Egypt and managed to persist after the Islamic State was surpassed. The Sinai Province received huge losses from the security forces, but they could reorganize themselves. The organization has taken the tools of the cells in the cities and now is working with lone attackers. They are mostly snipers, who could work in invaded territories and cause loss easily. After the attacks, they could vanish and choose another target. The Sinai Province is so flexible, that they have found an antidote to the government's economic development. This was based on

the redeployment of the locals, so the terrorists are leaving booby-traps in the abandoned villages, which caused heavy damage to the resettled civilians.

Meanwhile, the government used mostly military tools against the insurgent. These tools were mostly unflexible, and the terrorists managed to avoid them or used them against the soldiers. The military tried to contain the insurgents with checkpoints inside the cities, which made the military mobilize, and exposed them to the attack of the terrorists. They also used heavy weapons against the insurgents (tanks, troop carrier vehicles) which could be attacked easily with roadside bombs and suicide bombings. The security forces used helicopters and airstrikes against the hideouts of the terrorists, which caused little damage to the manpower, but possibly they could destroy their weapons.

They changed their methods also. In the military sphere, the soldiers tried to break out from the checkpoints and made patrolling activities. With these changes, they managed to answer the terrorist attacks and detained many members of these organizations. They also tried to gain information from the locals and from the tribes, who refused to ally themselves with the terrorists after they attacked their members. Thus they joined the army and helped them hunt down the terrorist cells. The tribes managed to arrest one of the top leaders of the Sinai Province, who gives help to the tribes against the terrorist group.

To defeat the terrorist cells, the security forces closed down the Egyptian borders eliminating the terrorists from their supply. In 2018 they simultaneously make operations in the western and eastern border areas of the country stopping the cells from receiving weapons and manpower. It worked and the Sinai Province lost many members. Inside the country, they detained the members of the terrorist groups, and I haven't received any news about their attacks in the last two years.

The government realized that it couldn't defeat the extremists with only military tools. They used development policy to gain the trust of the locals in the Sinai. So in the last few years, a huge development program was started which aimed the improvement the lifestyle of the locals. It resulted in many achievements but its effect will be cleared later. However, the terrorists found the antidote against it and attacked the civilians, who tried to resettle in their homes. Also, the military made harsh treatment of the locals, and they didn't forgive easily. They have much work to do if they want to persuade the civilians to help them.

The government can rely on the tribes in that area, or free some of their detained persons to show the locals their goodwill. Maybe this can help the military to eliminate the terrorist threat. They also can collaborate with the governments of the neighboring countries, because in their country there can be connections with the Sinai Province. If they exploit their

knowledge, the Egyptians possibly explore the organization of the terrorist cells in their country and eliminate their threat.

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